This paper is an effort to extract some of the main theses in the philosophy of mathematics from my book, The Construction of Logical Space. I show that there are important limits to the availability of nominalistic paraphrase-functions for the language of arithmetic, and suggest a way around the problem by developing a method for specifying nominalistic contents without corresponding nominalistic paraphrases.
Nominalism
Mathematical Nominalism is the view that there are no mathematical objets. A standard problem for nominalists is that it is not obvious that they can explain what the point of a mathematical assertion would be. For it is natural to think that mathematical sentences like 'the number of the dinosaurs is zero' or '1 + 1 = 2' can only be true if mathematical objects exist. But if this is right, the nominalist is committed to the view that such sentences are untrue. And if the sentences are untrue, it not immediately obvious that they would be worth asserting.
A nominalist could try to address the problem by suggesting nominalistic paraphrases for mathematical sentences. She might claim, for example, that when one asserts 'the number of the dinosaurs is zero' one is best understood as making the (nominalistically kosher) claim that there are no dinosaurs, and that when one asserts '1 + 1 = 2' one is best understood as making the (nominalistically kosher) claim that any individual and any other individual will, taken together, make two individuals.
1 Such a strategy faces two main challenges. The first is to explain why mathematical assertions are to be understood non-standardly. One way for our nominalist to address this challenge is by claiming that mathematical assertions are set forth 'in a spirit of makebelieve' (Yablo 2001) . She might claim, in particular, that when one asserts 'the number of the dinosaurs is zero' one is describing a fiction whereby the non-mathematical world is unchanged but mathematical objects exist with the standard properties. Describing the fiction, however, is not an idle exercise. It can give us valuable information about the real world. We know, for example, that 'the number of the dinosaurs is zero' will only be true in the fiction if 'there are no dinosaurs' is true in the real world. So we can learn from a (fictionalist) assertion of 'the number of the dinosaurs is zero' that the real world contains no dinosaurs.
The second main challenge is that of specifying nominalistic paraphrases for arbitrary mathematical sentences. It is perfectly straightforward to come up with plausible nominalistic paraphrases for toy sentences like 'the number of the dinosaurs is zero' or '1 + 1 = 2'.
But we need is a method that will work in general.
Say that a paraphrase-function (for language L with output-language L N ) is an effectively specifiable function that assigns to each sentence in L a paraphrase in L N . One of the main objectives of this paper is to show that finding a nominalist paraphrase-function is not as easy as one might have thought.
1 More carefully: ∀x∀y(x = y → ∃! 2 z(z = x ∨ z = y)).
What would it take for a paraphrase-function for the language of (applied) arithmetic to count as a nominalist paraphrase-function? Consider the following three constraints:
The Counting Constraint
The paraphrase assigned to The number of the F s = n should have the same truthconditions as ∃! n x(F x) . 2 
The Inferential Constraint
Suppose that φ and ψ are arithmetical sentences, and that the truth-conditions of φ are at least as strong as the truth-conditions of ψ (for short: φ entails ψ). Then the paraphrase assigned to φ should entail the paraphrase assigned to ψ.
The Triviality Constraint
(a) The paraphrase assigned to any true sentence of pure arithmetic should have trivial truth-conditions (that is, truth-conditions that would be satisfied regardless of how the world turned out to be).
(b) The paraphrase assigned to any false sentence of pure arithmetic should have impossible truth-conditions (that is, truth conditions that would fail to be satisfied regardless of how the world turned out to be).
It seems to me that a paraphrase-function satisfying these three constraints (for short: a trivialist paraphrase-function) should be thought of as the 'gold standard' of nominalist paraphrase-functions. It is hard to see how a nominalist paraphrase-function could deserve the label 'nominalist' if it failed to respect the Counting Constraint, and it is clear that something important would be left out if it failed to respect the Inferential Constraint. And although some nominalists might be willing to settle for a paraphrase-function that failed to satisfy the Triviality Constraint, I hope it can be agreed on all sides that the nominalist should prefer a paraphrase-function that satisfies the Triviality Constraint over one that does not.
Notice, for example, that the Triviality Constraint is a natural consequence of the fictionalist proposal we considered above. Consider '1 + 1 = 2'. As in the case of any other truth of pure mathematics, this sentence will count as true in the fiction regardless of how the actual world happens to be. So-insofar as one thinks that the nominalistic reading of '1 + 1 = 2' should express the condition that the real world would have to satisfy in order for '1 + 1 = 2' to count as true in the fiction-one should think that the nominalistic reading of '1 + 1 = 2' has trivial truth-conditions.
It is also worth noting that the Triviality Constraint was satisfied by the nominalistic reading that I had earlier suggested for '1 + 1 = 2'. For the paraphrase I suggested is a logical truth, and it is reasonable to assume that the truths of pure logic have trivial truthconditions. One might be inclined to think that it would be desirable for this to be true in general. It would be desirable for the nominalistic reading of any truth of pure mathematics to be a logical truth and therefore have trivially satisfiable truth-conditions.
The Bad News
The bad news is that it is impossible to specify a trivialist paraphrase-function for the language of arithmetic. A little more carefully: there is a formal result that suggests that it is impossible to specify a paraphrase-function for the language of arithmetic that is uncontroversially trivialist.
Here 'uncontroversial' means three different things: (1) no controversial linguistic assumptions, (2) no controversial metaphysical assumptions, and (3) no controversial subtractionassumptions. I will say a few words about each kind of assumption before turning to the formal result itself.
Controversial Linguistic Assumptions
If the expressive resources of one's output-language-i.e. the language in which nominalistic paraphrases are given-are sufficiently powerful, it is straightforward to define a trivialist paraphrase-function.
There is, for example, a method for paraphrasing each sentence of the language of arithmetic as a sentence of an (ω + 3)-order language. 3 Would this count as a trivialist paraphrasefunction? Yes: if one assumes that (ω + 3)-order logic is 'genuine logic' (if one assumes, in other words, that any truth of (ω + 3)-order logic has trivial truth-conditions). That is, however, a highly controversial assumption.
The view that second-order logic is 'genuine logic' is increasingly popular amongst philosophers. But most philosophers seem to think that languages of high finite order-to say nothing of languages of transfinite-order-can only be made sense of as 'set theory in sheep's clothing' (Quine 1986) , and many philosophers would conclude on that basis that the truths of higher-order logic have non-trivial truth-conditions.
My own view is that (ω + 3)-order logic is, in fact, 'genuine logic', 4 and that our (ω + 3)-paraphrase-function is, in fact, a trivialist paraphrase function. But even I must concede that it is not uncontroversially a trivialist paraphrase-function. The linguistic assumptions one would need to justify such a claim are just too great.
Controversial Metaphysical Assumptions
There is a nominalistic paraphrase-function that I find very attractive. It draws its inspiration from Frege's Grundlagen, so I will refer to it as the Fregean paraphrase-function. The basic idea is that a sentence of the form 'the number of the F s = the number of the Gs' is to be paraphrased as:
the F s are just as many as the Gs What about a quantified arithmetical sentence, such as 'there is an n > 0 such that: n = the number of the planets'? We first paraphrase the sentence as:
there are some things, the F s, such that: the number of the F s = the number of the planets
We then eliminate arithmetical-terms altogether, and say:
there are some things, the F s, such that: the F s are just as many as the planets.
It is easy to show that similar transformations can be applied to every sentence in the language of applied arithmetic (excluding mixed-identity statements such as 'Caesar = 17'.).
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The result is a nominalistic paraphrase-function that assigns to each arithmetical sentence a second-order sentence. 6 Suppose we concede that second-order logic is 'genuine logic', and that the truths of second-order logic have trivial truth-conditions. Is this enough to conclude that the Fregean Paraphrase-Function is a trivialist paraphrase-function? No-at least not if what we're looking for is an uncontroversially trivialist paraphrase-function. For consider 'any number greater than 0 has a successor', which is a truth of pure arithmetic. Its Fregean paraphrase is:
For any things, the F s, there are some things, the Gs, such that: for some g amongst the Gs, the F s are just as many as the Gs distinct from g. 5 I spell out the details in (Rayo 2002) ; for a similar proposal, see (Fine 2002, II.5) . 6 Alternatively, one could think of the paraphrase-function as assigning to each arithmetical sentence a sentence of a plural language which has been enriched with the atomic plural predicate 'they are just as many as them'. Here I fudge the distinction between the two for expositional purposes. For more on plural languages, see (Boolos 1984) and (Linnebo 2004). which will only be true if there are infinitely many objects (or none). So we have a violation of the Triviality Constraint. More guardedly: we have a violation of the Triviality Constraint unless we are prepared to accept the following (highly controversial) metaphysical thesis:
Trivialist Infinitarianism
Not only is it the case that the world contains infinitely many objects, it is trivially the case that the world contains infinitely many objects. In other words:
to assume that the world is finite is to assume something worse than false, it is to assume something absurd.
I myself think that Trivialist Infinitarianism is true. 7 8 This is true, in particular, of (Hodes 1984) and (Yablo 2002) . It is also true of a form of if-then-ism whereby a sentence φ is paraphrased as the universal closure of (A → φ) * , where A is the conjunction of the secondorder Dedekind-axioms and φ * is the result of uniformly replacing arithmetical vocabulary for variables of appropriate type.
A potential worry about this paraphrase-method is that it relies on a non-trivial subtraction-assumption. Suppose, for example, that φ is a complex physical theory couched in a mathematical language (string theory, as it might be). Melia's method presupposes that the operation of subtracting away the 'mathematical part' from the content of φ yields a welldefined result. Mark Colyvan (2010) has a nice analogy to illustrate why Melia's subtractionassumption might be problematic: J. R. R. Tolkien could not, for example, late in the Lord of the Rings trilogy, take back all mention of hobbits; they are just too central to the story. If Tolkien did retract all mention of hobbits, we would be right to be puzzled about how much of the story prior to the retraction remains, and we would also be right to demand an abridged story-a paraphrase of the hobbitless story thus far.
It should be clear, in any case, that the operation of content-subtraction is not generally well defined. What would be left, for example, if one subtracted someone is thirsty from I'm thirsty (Yablo 2012) ? Or if one subtracted the tomato is red from the tomato is scarlet (Searle & Körner 1959 , Woods 1967 , Kraemer 1986 , Yablo 2012 An example that I find particularly illuminating concerns the notion of narrow content. Narrow contents are supposed to be the result of subtracting away certain kinds of environmental facts from the contents of our beliefs (Brown 1992) . The narrow content corresponding to my belief that water is wet, for example, is supposed to be the result of subtracting the fact that certain items in my environment are composed of H 2 O from what I believe when I believe that water is wet. The claim that narrow-contents are well-defined is a highly controversial philosophical thesis. So one can use the debate between friends and foes of narrow content to underscore the fact that the operation of subtracting 'environmental factors' from the contents of our beliefs shouldn't be assumed to be well-defined without further ado. What about the operation of subtracting mathematical content from arithmetical claims? Do we get well-defined results in that case? I don't think the answer is obvious.
The most straightforward way of justifying the claim that the results are well-defined would be to set-forth a nominalist paraphrase-function-one that does not itself rely on subtraction-assumptions. One would then be in a position to claim that the result of subtracting away the 'mathematical part' from the content of a mathematical sentence is simply the content of the sentence's paraphrase. But the relevant paraphrase-function had better be a trivialist paraphrase-function. For we presumably want it to be the case that the result of subtracting away 'the mathematical part' from a truth of pure mathematics is always an empty content: a content that would be satisfied however the world turned out to be.
As we have seen, however, it is not easy to find an uncontroversial example of a trivialist paraphrase-function. So it is not immediately obvious that one could justify the claim that the operation of subtracting mathematical content delivers well-defined results.
My own view is that Melia's use of the subtraction-operation does, in fact, deliver welldefined results. But I don't think that such a claim can be simply taken for granted: a substantial argument is required. (I will attempt to provide such an argument in section 4.) Melia's paraphrase-function has the advantage of wearing its subtraction-assumption on its sleeve. But it is worth noting that similar assumptions are required by several other nominalist paraphrase-methods:
Method Paraphrase φ as . . .
Subtraction-Assumptions
Fictionalism φ is true according to a fiction which is accurate in all non-mathematical respects but in which mathematical objects exist with the standard properties (Yablo 2001).
1. There is a well-defined fact of the matter as to whether a fiction agrees with reality in nonmathematical respects (i.e. whether the result of subtracting the 'mathematical part' from the fiction agrees with the result of subtracting the 'mathematical part' from the world).
2. What does a claim about the fiction teach us about the real world? The result of subtracting the 'mathematical part' from the original claim.
Modalism φ is true at the closest possible world which agrees with the actual world in non-mathematical respects but in which mathematical objects exist with the standard properties (Hellman 1989 , Dorr 2007 ).
1. There is a well-defined fact of the matter as to whether worlds agree in non-mathematical respects (i.e. whether they agree on the result of subtracting the 'mathematical part' from what each of them say).
2. What does a claim about the counterfactual world teach us about the actual world? The result of subtracting the 'mathematical part' from the original claim.
SubjectMatterism
φ is true as far as its nonmathematical subjectmatter is concerned, where a claim's nonmathematical subjectmatter is defined as the set of worlds which agree in all non-mathematical respects with a world at which the claim is literally true (Yablo 2012).
2. What does a claim about truth-as-far-as-nonmathematical-subject-matter-is-concerned teach us about the actual world? The result of subtracting the 'mathematical part' from the original claim.
It is instructive to note that each of these paraphrase-methods could be easily modified so as to deliver a 'narrowist' paraphrase-method, in which paraphrases are meant to capture the narrow contents of the original claims, rather than their nominalistic contents. (One could, for example, talk about a fiction which is accurate in all internal respects but in which 'environmental factors' may or may not be as in reality, instead of talking about a fiction which is accurate in all non-mathematical respects but in which mathematical objects exist.) Just as the resulting 'narrowist' paraphrase-functions would do nothing to move a foe of narrow contents, the nominalistic paraphrase-functions in the table above should do nothing to move a skeptic of Melia's subtraction-assumption.
The Formal Result
Earlier I claimed that it is impossible to specify a paraphrase-function for the language of arithmetic that is uncontroversially trivialist. I am now in a position to give a precise statement of the underlying formal result.
First some assumptions:
A1 We shall assume that our output-language is an nth-order language (for finite n). We shall assume that this condition can be met even if the output-language has a finite domain.
Think of A1-A3 as stating, respectively, that our paraphrase-function is to make no controversial linguistic assumptions, that it is to make no controversial subtraction-assumptions, and that it is to make no controversial metaphysical assumptions. More precisely:
• A1 places an upper bound on the expressive resources of the output-language. Such a bound is justified by the fact that the use of a language more powerful than any nthorder language (for finite n) would be a sure sign of a controversial linguistic assumption in the sense of section 3.1. (As I noted above, the use of a third-order language would be pretty controversial already, but I'm trying to keep my assumptions as weak as possible.)
• A2 is a ban on intensional operators, and is intended to ensure that our paraphrasefunction makes no controversial subtraction-assumptions. I have certainly not shown that any sensible paraphrase-method based on intensional operators will require controversial subtraction-assumptions. But as the table in section 3.3 illustrates, such assumptions are required by the most natural methods for supplying intensional paraphrases for language of applied arithmetic.
• A3 is meant to ensure that our paraphrase-method does not rely on infinity assumptions. This is important because-unless one embraces Trivialist Infinitarinism, which is a decidedly controversial metaphysical thesis-one should think that no trivialist paraphrase-function can presuppose an infinite domain. Now that our assumptions are in place, it is easy to state the formal result:
Impossibility Theorem
No paraphrase-function for the language of arithmetic can satisfy A1-A3.
The proof is totally straightforward. By assumptions 1 and 2, our output-language is a nthorder language (for finite n) with a finite lexicon; by assumption 3, our paraphrase-function can preserve truth-value over pure sentences even if the output-language is assumed to have a finite domain. But the set of truths of an nth-order language with a finite lexicon on a finite domain is effectively specifiable. So our paraphrase-function would deliver a decision procedure for arithmetical truth, which we know to be impossible from Gödel's Theorem.
To the extent that one is prepared to think of A1-A3 as capturing the idea that there are to be no controversial assumptions, one can think of this result as showing that no paraphrase-function for the language of arithmetic can be uncontroversially trivialist.
A Way Forward
Let us take stock. We started out by noting that the nominalist faces a challenge: she needs to explain what the point of making a mathematical assertion might be. We then noted that the challenge might be addressed by offering nominalistic paraphrases for mathematical sentences, and going on to claim that the point of asserting a mathematical sentence can be to convey the content of its paraphrase.
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What should a nominalist paraphrase-function look like? I listed three constraints in section 2, and suggested that paraphrase-functions satisfying those constraints-i.e. trivialist paraphrase-functions-should be thought of as the 'gold standard' of nominalist paraphrase.
We have seen, however, that that the Impossibility Theorem suggests that there is no way of specifying a trivialist paraphrase function for the language of arithmetic without making controversial assumptions.
What is the nominalist to do? She could embrace one of the nominalist paraphrasefunctions we discussed above, and insist that it is a trivialist paraphrase-function by making a controversial assumption. Or she could settle for a nominalist paraphrase-function that falls short of the gold standard.
Here I will propose an alternative. The first thing to note is that that our real reason for being interested in nominalistic paraphrases was as a means for specifying nominalistic contents for arithmetical sentences. We were hoping to claim, in particular, that the nominalistic content of a mathematical sentence is the content of the sentence's nominalist paraphrase.
But once we have the nominalistic contents at hand we can put them to theoretical use without bringing in the paraphrases.
What I propose to do here is cut out the middle man. I will argue that there is a method for specifying the nominalistic contents of arithmetical sentences that does not proceed via paraphrases. This alternative method has an advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage is that it delivers trivialist contents (i.e. contents satisfying analogues of the three conditions in section 2), and does so without making controversial philosophical assumptions of the kind discussed in section 3. The disadvantage is that the method is couched in mathematical language, and is therefore only available to someone who is prepared to engage in mathematical practice. As we will see in section 4.2, this places certain limits on the purposes for which the proposal can be deployed.
Outscoping
On the view I would like to discuss, one assigns nominalistic contents to mathematical sentences by way of a compositional semantics: an assignment of semantic values to basic lexical items, together with a set of rules for assigning semantic values to a complex expression on the basis of the semantic values of its constituent parts.
I will assume that the semantic value of a sentence is a set of possible worlds. Accordingly, a compositional semantics should allow us to prove a statement of the following form for each sentence φ of the object language:
φ is true at world w if and only if w is such that . . .
The usual way of interpreting such a clause is as a specification of φ's truth-conditions, that
is, as a specification of the condition that a world w would need to satisfy in order for φ to count as true at w. Here, however, we will be using the compositional semantics to specify nominalistic contents, rather than truth-conditions. We will therefore interpret the clause above as a specification of the condition that a world w would need to satisfy in order for φ's nominalistic content to be satisfied at w. where 'φ' is a sentence of the object-language and 'p' is a nominalistic paraphrase of that sentence in the metalanguage. A compositional semantics that only outputs sentential clauses of this form will be severely limited in its ability to specify nominalistic contents, since it presupposes that one is in a position to specify a nominalist paraphrase-function for the objectlanguage in the metalanguage. And, as we have seen, there are good reasons for thinking that it is impossible to specify a trivialist paraphrase-function for the language of arithmetic without making controversial assumptions. How must w represent reality in order to satisfy the right-hand-sides of each of these clauses?
In the case of [WIDE] , w must represent reality as being such that there is a number which numbers the dinosaurs and is identical to zero. So [WIDE] associates a Platonist content with '# x (Dinosaur(x)) = 0': a content whose satisfaction requires the existence of numbers. In the case of [NARROW] , on the other hand, all it takes for the right-hand-side of the clause to be satisfied is for nothing to be such that w represents it as being a dinosaur. So
[NARROW]-unlike [WIDE]-remains neutral on the question of whether w must represent reality as containing numbers.
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The crucial feature of [NARROW] is, of course, that all arithmetical vocabulary has been outscoped: it has been removed from the range of '[. . .] w '. So although one uses arithmetical vocabulary in the metalanguage to characterize a requirement on w, the requirement itself brings in no specifically arithmetical constraints: it is simply the requirement that nothing be counted by w as a dinosaur. The role of arithmetical vocabulary is to impose a metatheoretical test that will ensure that such a requirement is met: one asks, in the metalanguage, for the number of the objects that are counted as dinosaurs by w and demands that that number be zero. But because the test is performed while working outside the scope of '[. . .] w ', one doesn't have to presuppose that the resources one uses to perform the test are present in w.
12 Here I assume, for simplicity, that the domain of the metalanguage includes merely possible objects. Without this assumption-or, alternatively, without the assumption of necesitism (Williamson 2013)-[NARROW] 's right-hand-side will be satisfied by worlds which represent reality as containing dinosaurs but don't represent of any actually existing individual that it is a dinosaur, and it therefore won't succeed in associating with '# x (Dinosaur(x)) = 0' the condition that there be no dinosaurs. Happily, there is a technical trick that allows one get the right results without surrendering modal actualism (or contingentism); see (Rayo 2008) , (Rayo 2012) and (Rayo 2013, Chapter 6) for details.
As it turns out, it is possible to give a compositional semantics that delivers suitably outscoped semantic clauses for every sentence in the language of arithmetic (and, indeed, for every sentence in the language of set-theory). Not just that: the resulting clauses succeed in delivering the gold standard. They specify trivialist nominalistic contents, and do so with no need for controversial philosophical assumptions of the kind we discussed in section 3.
(See the appendix for a detailed statement of the semantics.)
Our semantics assigns every truth of pure arithmetic a trivial semantic clause (i.e. a clause whose right-hand-side will be satisfied by a world w regardless of how reality is represented by w), and it assigns every falsehood of pure arithmetic is assigned an impossible semantic clause (i.e. a clause whose right-hand-side will fail to be satisfied by w regardless of how reality is represented by w). The reason we get this result is that, when it comes to sentences of pure arithmetic, everything gets outscoped. The clause for '1 + 1 = 2', for example, will be:
'1 + 1 = 2' is true at w if and only if 1 + 1 = 2 in which nothing remains in the scope of '[. . .] w '. Since the right-hand-side of this biconditional is true (and contains no free variables), it will be satisfied by w regardless of how the world is represented by w. So our semantics will assign a trivial nominalistic content to '1 + 1 = 2'.
What Outscoping Can and Cannot Do
Our trivialist semantic is couched in an arithmetical language. So use of the theory presupposes that one is able to understand arithmetical vocabulary. Not just that: in order to extract illuminating results from an outscoped semantic clause, one usually needs to prove an arithmetical claim in the metatheory . (In arguing that the semantic clause for '1 + 1 = 2' delivers a trivial content, for example, I made use of the fact that 1+1=2.) So illuminating use of our semantic theory presupposes that one is able to prove arithmetical results in one's metatheory. Either of these presuppositions would be utterly uncontroversial in a non-philosophical context. But it is worth considering how they play out in the present discussion.
It will be useful to start by seeing things from the point of view of a mathematical Platonist: someone who thinks that mathematical objects exist. Suppose, for example, that our Platonist is interested in the project of understanding which nominalistic contents a nominalist would wish to associate with arithmetical sentences. Since the Platonist feels comfortable using arithmetical vocabulary, she is in a position to set forth the trivialist semantics we have been discussing, and read off the nominalistic content of arithmetical sentences form the outscoped semantic clauses that are delivered by the semantics.
In doing so, our Platonist will have found a way around the Impossibility Theorem of section 3. For even if she lacks a general method for characterizing trivialist paraphrases for arithmetical sentences, our Platonist will have succeeded in finding a general method for characterizing trivialist contents for arithmetical sentences. It is true that she will have used arithmetical vocabulary in the process. But this is no threat to the project because the contents themselves will involve no specifically arithmetical constraints.
We started out assuming that the Platonist is interested in the project of characterizing nominalistic contents in order to better understand the nominalist, but she might also be interested in the project for a different purpose. Suppose she wishes to understand how arithmetical claims can be relevant to one's knowledge of the natural world (Steiner 1998 , Yablo 2001 . She might hypothesize that the answer is partly to do with the fact that an arithmetical claim like 'the number of the dinosaurs is zero' can impose non-trivial demands on the natural world, and see her outscoped semantic clauses as supplying a precise statement of the relevant demands.
Relatedly, our Platonist might wish to know whether the operation of content-subtraction is generally well-defined in the arithmetical case. Suppose, in other words, that she wishes to know whether Melia is right to think that one is generally left with a well-defined content when one subtracts the 'the part about numbers' from an arithmetical claim. Our Platonist will see the trivialist semantic theory as decisive proof that the operation is indeed welldefined. For she will see the outscoped semantic clause corresponding to each arithmetical sentence as a precise statement of the result of subtracting 'the mathematical part' from the relevant arithmetical claim. (This is what I meant in section 3.3 when I reported thinking that Melia's use of the subtraction-operation was, indeed, well-defined.)
We have been seeing things from the perspective of a Platonist. But what would a nominalist make of our trivialist semantics? It seems to me that the important issue is not whether one is a nominalist, but whether one is prepared to engage in mathematical practice. Suppose, for example, that our nominalist is also a fictionalist, and that she is happy to engage in mathematical practice: she proves mathematical theorems and uses mathematical vocabulary in making claims about the world; in her more philosophical moments, however, she insists that her mathematical assertions are set forth 'in a spirit of make believe' and that there really are no mathematical objects. A nominalist of this kind should have no difficulty working with the trivialist semantics that we have been discussing, and using outscoped semantic clauses to give a precise statement of the nominalisitic content of her mathematical assertions.
A nominalist who would be bared from employing the trivialist semantics is a nominalist who is also a mathematical nihilist: someone who thinks that one cannot engage in normal mathematical practice. The nihilist would not be prepared to assert 'the number of the dinosaurs is zero' in describing the world, even if she thought there were no dinosaurs; for similar reasons, she would not be prepared to use a mathematically formulated semantic clause to characterize a nominalistic content. Our trivialist semantics is also unavailable to a mathematical novice: someone who is not competent in the use of mathematical vocabulary.
We set out to give a precise characterization of the nominalistic contents of arithmetical sentences. Had we been able to do so by way of an uncontroversially trivialist paraphrasefunction, we would have been in position to satisfy both the nihilist and the novice. But the Impossibility Theorem shows that there are real limits to what can be done when it comes to giving paraphrases. Our trivialist semantics allows us to circumvent the theorem, but it is only available to someone who is prepared to engage in ordinary mathematical practice.
This excludes the nihilist and the novice, but I don't think such an exclusion is a high price to pay, because neither of them represent serious philosophical positions.
Logicism
When we discussed outscoping the preceding section, we were thinking of it as a means for specifying the nominalistic contents of arithmetical sentences rather than their literal truthconditions. But there is room for arguing that our trivialist compositional semantics is, in fact, an accurate statement of literal truth-conditions. On such a view, all that is required of the world for 'the number of the dinosaurs is zero' to be literally true is that there be no dinosaurs, and nothing is required of the world for '1 + 1 = 2' to be literally true.
Should one conclude from this that arithmetical sentences don't carry commitment to numbers? Not according to the version of the proposal I wish to consider here. I would like to consider a view whereby it is both the case that 'the number of the dinosaurs is zero' is committed to the number zero, and that all that is required of the world for 'the number of the dinosaurs is zero' to be literally true is that there be no dinosaurs.
The proposal escapes incoherence by endorsing the following claim:
For the number of the dinosaurs to be zero just is for there to be no dinosaurs.
and, more generally, [NUMBERS] For the number of the F s to be n just is for it to be the case that ∃! n x(F x).
A friend of [NUMBERS] thinks that there is no difference between there being no dinosaurs and their number's being zero, in the same sort of way that there is no difference between drinking a glass of water and drinking a glass of H 2 O. More colorfully: when God crated the world and made it the case that there was water to be drank, there was nothing extra she needed to do or refrain from doing to make it the case that there was H 2 O to be drank. She was already done. Similarly, a friend of [NUMBERS] thinks that when God created the world and made it the case that there would be no dinosaurs in 2013, there was nothing extra she needed to do or refrain from doing to make it the case that the number of the dinosaurs in 2013 would be zero. She was already done.
An immediate consequence of [NUMBERS] is that a world without numbers would be inconsistent:
Proof: Assume, for reductio, that there are no numbers. By [NUMBERS] , for the number of numbers to be zero just is for there to be no numbers. So the number of numbers is zero. So zero exists. So a number exists. Contradiction. Someone who accepts [NUMBERS] can claim both that the truth-conditions of 'the number of the dinosaurs is zero' consist entirely of the requirement that the number of the dinosaurs be zero, and that they consist entirely of the requirement that there be no dinosaurs.
She can make both these claims because she thinks that the proposed requirements are one and the same: there is no difference between there being no dinosaurs and their number's being zero.
The trivialist semantic theory we set forth in the preceding section can be used to generalize this idea to every sentence in the language of arithmetic. One can claim that the literal truth-conditions of an arithmetical sentence are accurately stated both by a standard (homophonic) compositional semantics and by our trivialist semantics with outscoped semantic clauses. But the two semantic theories do not contradict one another because the truth-conditions they associate with a given sentence are, in fact, one and the same: there is no difference between what would be required of the world to satisfy the truth-conditions delivered by one semantic theory and what would be required of the world to satisfy the truth-conditions delivered by the other.
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Consider '1 + 1 = 2' as an example. A standard (homophonic) semantics tells us that the truth-conditions of '1 + 1 = 2' demand of the world that it contain numbers. Our trivialist semantics tells us that the truth-conditions are trivial-that they will be satisfied regardless of how the world happens to be. But the two claims are consistent with each other because the existence of numbers is a trivial affair. '1 + 1 = 2' carries commitment to numbers, but this is a commitment that will be satisfied regardless of how the world happens to be.
What does this tell us about logicism-the view that mathematics can be reduced to logic?
The Impossibility Theorem of section 3 suggests that the formal systems that contemporary philosophers tend to think of as 'pure logic' are not expressive enough to capture basic arithmetic. So one might think of the theorem as a refutation of logicism: in an interesting sense, mathematics cannot be reduced to logic. But one could also think of the view developed in the present section as a certain kind of vindication of logicism. For it delivers the result that the truths of pure arithmetic-like the truths of pure logic-have trivially satisfiable truth-conditions, and the result that the falsehoods of pure arithmetic-like the falsehoods of pure logic-have impossible truth conditions. Admittedly, one also gets the result that a truth of pure arithmetic can carry commitment to numbers. But because the existence of numbers is a trivial affair, there is room for thinking of numbers as 'logical objects', as in Frege's Grundgesetze . 
